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Introduction
Regional organizations in the Global North have sought to create avenues for legitimating
integrationist activities. Participatory initiatives are one such route. Referring to mecha-
nisms whereby ‘independently created forms of collective action’, encompassing trade
unions, special interest groups and pressure groups, political parties, business organiza-
tions, and mass social movements can influence regional decision making, participatory
initiatives are proliferating among regionalist bodies (Gerard and Mickler, this issue).
This article argues that the proliferation of participatory mechanisms can be conceptual-
ized as the development of a ‘new technocracy’ in regionalist organizations. To make this
case, the article examines the case of regionalist participatory initiatives in the European
Union’s (EU) directorates and agencies.
Recently, an evolving literature on the EU as a ‘responsive technocracy’ has analysed
how the growing politicization of EU-level initiatives and institutions had led to those in-
stitutions responding by, for example, adopting new legislation (Rauh, 2016, 2019).
Scholars also suggest the need to analyse the ‘responsiveness’ of EU organizations at
an administrative level (De Wilde and Rauh, 2019). This article adds to this literature
by analysing the boundaries of participatory initiatives by analysing their technocratic
logic, and thus showing how they operate as methods for furthering ‘technocratic respon-
siveness’, rather than democratic innovation.
This argument about the limits of participatory initiatives is not new. Existing literature
also notes serious shortcomings given participatory initiatives tend to be colonised by
more powerful, often corporate, actors, and an economistic logic (Parker and
Pye, 2017). This article adds to the debate by unearthing the technocratic logic behind
them, using a framework developed in public administration scholarship on the ‘new
technocracy’ (Esmark, 2017). This ‘new technocracy’ is comprised of three aspects:
• Connectivity: EU institutions aim to circulate information online to inform relevant
‘multipliers’ at national level and relay detail of regulatory procedures.
• Risk management: EU institutions seek to craft an image of technical competence
through engagement with stakeholders, rather than relying on their independence to
ensure that image is created.
• Performance: EU institutions engaging with a variety of stakeholders as a core aspect
of monitoring and evaluating the EU’s regulatory performance.
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This framework draws upon a theory recently posited by Anders Esmark (2017, 2020)
that the concept of technocracy has been widely misunderstood in governance studies.
Contemporary forms of technocratic governance, Esmark argues, are intended to engage
broadly with civil society to enhance their functional utility, both at national and transna-
tional levels. They are characterized by the need to connect with relevant actors by ensur-
ing they receive relevant information, manage risk in terms of foreseeing and displacing
the possibility of political contestation, and monitor the performance of EU regulations.
The article argues that processes of public involvement are viewed by those engaged in
them as functional to EU institutions, and therefore can be seen principally as mecha-
nisms for extending technocratic legitimacy. To show this, the article analyses
semi-structured interviews with 24 European Union Commission Directorates-General
(DGs), civil society organizations and independent agencies, as well as stakeholder
engagement strategies and engagement requirements provided in governing regulations.
This article proceeds in four sections. First, it charts the evolution of the EU’s technoc-
racy and suggests that since the early 2000s EU institutions have responded to criticisms
they are insular and disconnected from the public. Second, it introduces Esmark’s theory
and suggests this can be applied as a way of framing this development as the emergence
of a new technocracy rather than a renewal of democratic legitimacy. Third, the article
presents interview and documentary evidence demonstrating how stakeholder engage-
ment processes in EU institutions are viewed by those who enact and receive them as
forms of technocratic governance enabling: (1) connectivity, (2) risk management and
(3) performance. Fourth, the article reflects upon the implications of this analysis for
our understanding of the potential of EU stakeholder engagement strategies as
normatively desirable forms of democratic participation. It suggests the development of
new technocracy might have potential, if its logic of seeking external legitimacy through
responsiveness can be developed to coincide with logics of participatory or deliberative
democracy.
I. From ‘Old’ to ‘New’ Technocracy in the EU
Technocracy has been an ever-present ‘spectre’ in European integration (Streeck, 2012).
Haas’ (1958) original thesis in The Uniting of Europe that practical concerns about
economic growth and political stability would lead to ‘ever closer union’ has influenced
EU scholars and policymakers, who became concerned principally with developing legit-
imacy through the ‘outputs’ produced by expert-led institutions. This ‘neofunctionalist’
argument, as Moravcsik (2005, p. 350) suggests, ‘remains a touchstone for scholarship
and, albeit tacitly, for practical politics concerning the EU’. As Martin Shapiro (2004,
p. 345) states, in the EU the ‘prevalent trend has been an attempt to recruit technocratic
legitimacy for government regulation as a substitute for democratic legitimacy’. This
form of technocratic rule has changed over time, however, and has implications for our
understanding of the boundaries of public participation in EU institutions.
What I call the ‘old technocracy’ has its roots in classical functionalist arguments about
the basis of European integration. Old technocracy is defined as ‘rule by experts’, seeking
legitimacy through checks and balances with public actors and institutions. Wallace and
Smith (1995) provide a detailed elaboration on how technocratic tendencies historically
influenced EU integration. The 1951 Treaty of Paris, they show, set up a High Authority
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(later to merge into the European Commission in 1967) advised by a Consultative Com-
mittee of ‘representative organizations’ including consumers, businesses and workers:
‘functional representation assisting technical experts’ (Wallace and Smith, 1995, p.142).
Here, the place of democracy was in essentially pluralist underpinnings of technocratic
rule. The High Authority had to ‘consult’ trade unions and employers, and its decisions
were taken in light of consultation. This approach carried through to the late 1980s, with
a 1988 regulation emphasising ‘close consultation between the Commission, the member
states concerned and the competent authorities’ (Regulation (EEC) 2052/88).
The old technocracy thus had its basis in pluralist assumptions, that: (1) there needed
to be a balance of power between competing interests of member states, and of economic
actors, and (2) the functional necessity of post-war economic recovery and growth pro-
vided an underpinning consensus for integration. Here, the boundaries of participation
are conceptualized in a Madisonian way, as a set of checks and balances on Commission
power by member states and, to a lesser extent, employer and worker representatives.
New technocracy is defined as ‘rule by experts’, seeking legitimacy through respon-
siveness to the public (see Table 1, below). This came about through the growing impor-
tance of ‘responsiveness’ as a key question through the 1990s and 2000s. The growth of
Euroscepticism since the 1980s led to theories that the ‘permissive consensus’ on integra-
tion had morphed into a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks, 2009). Scholars
noted growing politicization (De Wilde, 2011) and contestation of integrationist tenden-
cies (Adam and Maier, 2011). These political dynamics have not, however, led to the dis-
appearance of an earlier technocratic approach, but to its transformation. Analysing
dynamics of integration during the Eurozone crisis, Schimmelfennig (2014, p. 335) ar-
gues, ‘The process of technocratic integration during the crisis has largely followed
neofunctionalist instead of postfunctionalist expectations’. Supranational integration in-
creased in economic policy, for example, with technical agencies like the European Bank-
ing Authority gaining more power.
That is not to say, however, that the rationale for technocratic forms of governance
looked the same as in the 1950s, or that the boundaries of public participation are the
same. Rauh (2016, 2019, p. 361) instead identifies a ‘responsive technocracy’ in which
‘widespread EU politicization creates Commission incentives to serve immediate public
interests in contemporaneously salient initiatives’. His interview research suggests ‘Com-
mission bureaucrats, who are usually portrayed as the most distant and technocratic actors
in the EU’s polity, are aware about the immediate distributional consequences of their pol-
icy choices and are willing to adapt them to changes in the political context of European
Table 1: Boundaries of Participation in ‘Old’ and ‘New’ Technocracy
Logic for engagement Old technocracy New technocracy
Political context Permissive consensus Constraining dissensus
Rationale for seeking external
legitimacy
Checks and balances Responsiveness
Actors engaged Stakeholders in industry
and society
Stakeholders in industry and society
(expanded)
Exemplary texts Regulation (EEC) 2052/88 2001 European Commission White Paper on
Governance
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integration’ (Rauh, 2019, p. 361). This ‘responsiveness’ does not mean technocratic
institutions abandon their objectives. Rather, it suggests a subtle reconfiguration of the
boundaries of public participation, summarized in Table 1.
An incremental shift from ‘old’ to ‘new’ technocracy can broadly be captured in the
emergence of a participatory agenda initiated in the 2000s–2010s. In 2001 a widely cited
Commission White Paper stressed that ‘many people are losing confidence in a poorly
understood and complex system to deliver the policies that they want’ (European
Commission, 2001, p. 1). We can view this statement as an acknowledgement of a shift
in the political context from ‘permissive consensus’ to ‘constraining dissensus’. The
White Paper hence proposed the Commission should ‘renew the Community method by
following a less top-down approach and complementing the EU’s policy tools more effec-
tively with non-legislative instruments’ (European Commission, 2001, p. 2).
This agenda has been reflected in a deeper and more diverse range of consultation
processes, including ‘Roadmaps’ and ‘Inception Impact Assessments’ implemented by
all Commission DGs. The ‘Better Regulation’ initiative has also emerged, aiming to avoid
introducing new legislation by updating and improving existing laws, complementing
this with widespread engagement of relevant affected communities (Bunea and
Ibenskas, 2017).
The subtle difference between ‘old’ and ‘new’ technocracy is explicated here. While
the stakeholders are not too dissimilar to those established as representative organizations
in the 1951 Treaty of Paris creating the European Coal and Steel Community, the intensity
of interaction has increased substantially and the range of representatives expanded to
cover Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and consumers in various areas of EU
competence (see Arras and Beyers, 2020; Pérez-Durán, 2019; Wood, 2018). These
changes are incremental, and there has not been a scaling back of the technical role of
EU agencies and DGs. The most significant transformation, however, is the rationale
underpinning reasons for seeking legitimacy by engaging external environments – from
instituting checks and balances to responding to dynamics of politicization.
II. Administrative Responsiveness: The Rationale of the New Technocracy
Whereas in the ‘old’ technocracy participation is conceived as seeking legitimacy through
formalized checks and balances on Commission power, in ‘new’ technocracy engagement
is defined as expert-led agencies seeking legitimacy through responsiveness in a broader
context of politicization. This means the boundaries of participation are conceived poten-
tially wider, so as to effectively manage politicization pressures by including a range of
affected actors, but narrower in the sense that the flexibility of responsive technocracy
means engagement is justified largely on the basis of the implications of engagement
for the core workings of EU bodies. Responsiveness is conceptualized primarily as adjust-
ments to policy and institutional practice (such as adoption of legislation) in response to
politicization (De Wilde and Rauh, 2019). Analysing the underlying rationale for stake-
holder and societal engagement within an administrative context can unpack this is more
detail. De Wilde and Rauh (2019) suggest a fruitful approach shifting analysis from
‘systemic’ responsiveness (policy adjustments and legislative adoption) to a ‘procedural’
approach studying ‘dynamic adaptation’ of adminstrative actors to external pressures.
This article fits within this agenda. It assesses how managers of EU institutions
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conceptualize their engagement practices as responses to external pressures. In doing so,
it draws from recent innovations in public administration theory to establish a conceptual
framework from which to analyse participatory initiatives as forms of technocratic
responsiveness, in EU institutions.
Esmark’s (2017, 2020) framework for assessing the ‘new technocracy’ in public ad-
ministration is the most systematic recent theorization of how technocratic governance
has shifted in the so-called ‘late modern’ era of capitalism. Esmark (2017, p. 501) asks
the question: ‘how are we to interpret administrative reforms and policy that have chal-
lenged the bureaucratic model in recent decades?’ These reforms, he argues broadly, have
brought about an era of ‘governance’ characterized by fluid risks and dispersed informa-
tion. For some, this has led to a replacement of technocratic bureaucracy with engaged
and interconnected ‘governance’. However, Esmark is not so quick to dismiss the idea
of technocracy and ‘rule of experts’. His argument is that this rule has morphed to become
more responsive and engaged, rather than being introverted and withdrawn: ‘Although the
governance paradigm clearly deploys the language of organizational and technological
imperatives, it is not exactly hidden or subdued: it is rather an open, assertive, and largely
transparent paradigm’ (Esmark, 2017, p. 506). This theoretical perspective links well with
the procedural approach to responsiveness advocated by De Wilde and Rauh (2019).
Esmark’s argument is not that expert technocrats have become less powerful, but that
technocracy has become less associated with legitimation through bureaucratic rationality
(qua Max Weber), and more associated with self-legitimation through three aspects:
connective governance, risk management and performance management (Esmark, 2020).
Each element involves a shift in the way in which technocratic authority is legitimated, or
the ways in which appeals are made in an attempt to gain acceptance for political
authority (legitimacy). They provide a way of shifting analysis of ‘responsiveness’ as a
new organizing perspective on EU technocracy, down to the level of administrative
organization and management, as advocated by De Wilde and Rauh (2019).
Connective Governance
The first element is concerned with a shift from legitimation through formalized proce-
dures and processes of internal governance (for example Boards and advisory positions),
to the management of relatively uncontrolled information networks. This links to what
Esmark calls ‘connective governance’, which, drawing on Castell’s seminal work on
the ‘network society’, involving ‘the implementation and use of information technology,
largely conducted under the umbrella of e-governance’. Connective governance is defined
as designing decision making processes to come in line with evolutions in technology in
collecting information, including Web 2.0 and social media. ‘Rather than the design
and operation of social machines, connective governance requires the adoption of an in-
formational logic and the attempt to deal with the transformative effects of informational
flows’ (Esmark, 2017, p. 508; see also Esmark, 2020, p. 125). As such, connective gov-
ernance is concerned with the design of flexibility into decision making processes using
technological advances to collect information. In the ‘old’ technocracy this information
was less dispersed, and available through formal repositories, for example scientific
journals, and institutions such as universities or government departments. ‘Connectivity’
is required because this transformation in information ‘abundance’ requires governing
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actors to ensure regulatory information gets to those who require it to make or communi-
cate decisions. Actors who legitimate their decisions through connectivity set up and
manage complex information networks that at once facilitate ‘engagement’ with the
outside world, but for purposes of information collection and dissemination rather than
for explicitly democratic ends. The boundary we expect to see is that such exercises are
conceived as information gathering and disseminating, or any democratic element is
coincidental to their operation, rather than central to how they are justified.
Risk Management
The second element of the new technocracy is risk management (Esmark, 2020,
pp. 141–172). Drawing on Ulrich Beck’s classic argument about the emergence of the
risk society, Esmark argues that the new technocracy involves ‘the internalization of risk
and the impossibility of insurance against dangers and uncertainty’ (2017, p. 508).
Whereas ‘old’ technocracy was largely impervious to systemic risks, in the new technoc-
racy there is ‘a state of uninterrupted anticipation that can be described as state of perpet-
ual threat and permanent crisis requiring continuous change’. The engagement of
stakeholders ought to be viewed in this context, as such engagement is not done purely
to inform decision making, but to monitor and shape the external environment, such that
the public organization is constantly aware of emerging dangers and can smooth out the
concerns of relevant actors. While governments have always recognized and managed
threats and dangers, the key to the new technocracy is a shift from reaction to reflexivity,
the key point being the need to anticipate danger. This has profound implications for the
kind of legitimacy that experts can claim:
The realization that there is ultimately no protection against threats and that government
decisions are likely to exasperate existing problems and/or produce new ones makes the
original technocratic belief in the proportional relation between technical knowledge and
problem-solving capacity untenable (Esmark, 2017, p. 509).
The result of this disconnection is the need to alter the very grounds upon which techno-
cratic authority is claimed, namely through what Bob Jessop calls ‘self-reflexive irony’:
‘the reshaping of the technocratic ambition… such that the participants in governance rec-
ognize the likelihood of failure but then continue as if success were possible’
(Esmark, 2017, p. 509).
Risk management in the new technocracy can hence be defined as engagement for the
purposes of identifying, monitoring and designing responses to systemic dangers to orga-
nizational legitimacy. The new technocrats are clear that they are fallible, and thus look
towards multiple sources of authority to ‘collaborate’ and bolster their credentials as ef-
fective governors.
Performance Management
Last, the new technocracy engages society to improve performance management
(Esmark, 2020, pp. 173–202). Traditionally, external auditing procedures are used to
evaluate performance, usually on an annual basis. However, contemporary governance
is conspicuous by its commitment ‘to link the sequences of the traditional linear process
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of policy-making together in a cyclic and continuous process of innovation and learning
that will ensure the development of better policy solutions’ (Esmark, 2017). Here, the
legitimacy claims of transnational technocracy are based again on reflexivity, but with
an emphasis on monitoring and auditing. Performance management in this context can
hence be defined as engagement based on the aim of monitoring and auditing organiza-
tional learning and experimentation practices. While this element of new technocracy is
closely linked to that of old technocracy, it has greater flexibility built in:
The functionalism of early technocracy… was primarily invested in the creation of
models identifying and linking the key forces of the social machine. Learning from evi-
dence and continuous improvement of policy, by contrast, involves an experimentalist
ambition about finding out “what works and why” (Esmark, 2017, p. 511).
Esmark notes that this focus on experimentation also introduces greater standards of ac-
countability than older forms of ‘top-down’ expert knowledge. Experts are challenged
to a greater extent than before, to ‘transparency and… responsibility to continuously dem-
onstrate results and provide evidence to the general public, the media, and stakeholders
with a vested interest in particular issues’ (Esmark, 2017, p. 511). This again links scien-
tific or ‘epistemic’ legitimacy to engagement with external communities, rather than
legitimacy-by-default, as assumed in the ‘old’ technocracy (Table 2).
III. Methodology
The purpose of this article, and this special issue, is to analyse the boundaries of partici-
pation in regionalist organizations (Gerard and Mickler, this issue). This article therefore
does not set up benchmarks for comparing participation in ‘old’ and ‘new’ technocracy,
but instead assesses boundaries in how extensive participation is, and can be, from the
perspective of EU institutional actors. It does so by mobilising a dataset of 24
semi-structured interviews with managers in EU European Commission DGs,
Table 2: Aspects of the Rationale for Participation in Old and New Technocracy
Old technocracy New technocracy
Rationale for
external legitimacy










processes to come in line with
evolutions in technology in
collecting information.
Engagement with risks Reaction to crisis:
Risks are identified only once
they have caused a crisis.
Formal accountability processes.
Risk management: Engagement
for the purposes of identifying,
monitoring and designing responses
to systemic dangers to organizational
legitimacy
Monitoring outcomes External audit:
Independent private auditors
check and evaluate organizational
performance (for example finances)
Performance management:
Engagement based on
the aim of monitoring
organizational learning and
experimentation practices.
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decentralized arm’s length agencies and stakeholder representatives including industry,
consumer organizations and civil society representatives.
The aim of the interviews was to understand how stakeholder engagement methods
were understood by these actors, and therefore uncover their democratic potential and
basis for their legitimacy. I targeted stakeholder and communications managers in
agencies and DGs, and public affairs teams in industry, consumer and civil society
organizations. Interview invitations were sent out to all agencies and DGs, and a selection
of key stakeholders in agencies and DGs that responded to interview requests. This
purposive sampling method identified those within these organizations who were best
able to articulate at length how their organizations understand participatory initiatives,
their underlying logic and rationale.
These interviews are supplemented with document analysis of stakeholder engagement
strategies in 33 decentralized agencies and 53 DGs and agencies, covering post-2010
documents for each body. I also analysed historical laws and regulations regarding stake-
holder engagement, including the founding regulations for each EU agency requiring
stakeholder or public engagement. I analysed the documents in NVIVO using thematic
coding based on Esmark’s framework. The purpose of this coding was to highlight
portions of text of relevance to each element of the framework (some were relevant to
more than one). I then synthesised these inductively, into an analysis of each core concept
of the framework to identify the boundaries interviewees imposed on public/stakeholder
engagement, and why and how they come about.
IV. Inside Europe’s New Technocracy
Thus far this article has argued that technocratic governance in the EU takes the shape of
an outwardly open and engaged interface, which is designed with the purpose of encour-
aging broad stakeholder engagement. However, within this logic of engagement, there ex-
ists a latent functionalism requiring that actors with requisite expertise to inform
regulatory decisions be informed, involved and given priority in engaging with regulatory
decision-making. Requirements for risk management also lead stakeholder managers to
inform ‘affected’ actors via stakeholder consultation routes. We can see this technocracy
at work through the stakeholder engagement processes within the European Commis-
sion’s DGs, and the decentralized agencies that inform and carry out regulatory activities.
Connective Governance
First, EU institutions connect with the public via online consultation processes. This is a
key aspect of the ‘New Regulation’ agenda developed over the past ten years, in which
the Commission has sought to create an ‘online feedback tool [that] allows citizens and
stakeholders to express their views during the entire policy and law-making process’
(European Commission, 2016). The ‘feedback tool’, called ‘Have Your Say’, firstly
includes opportunities to give feedback on general ‘roadmaps’ and impact assessments
proposed by the Commission, usually over a period of four weeks. It then includes public
consultation periods on new initiatives or evaluations of existing laws and regulations,
usually covering 12 weeks, and for Commission recommendations to the European
Parliament, usually eight weeks. There are also specific online consultation periods of
four weeks for delegated and implementing acts, and broader opportunities to submit a
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proposal for ‘lightening the load’–simplifying burdensome EU regulations–submitted via
a separate platform (‘REFIT’).
These general procedures operate alongside attempts to connect with European citizens
online via websites and social media. For example, agencies issue calls for key personnel
or Board members: ‘usually the [agency] calls for an expression of interest via the website.
We usually ask the National Competent Authority to relate this call for expression of inter-
est’ (Interview 8). DGs use websites as forums for engagement and as tools for achieving
‘stakeholder engagement’, as one manager notes: ‘In terms of the value of stakeholder en-
gagement we used to have a platform… for stakeholders… There is also… an open discus-
sion of specific networks, it’s an online platform.’ These platforms also extend to ways of
tracking and maintaining a handle on the range of stakeholders these institutions need to
connect to, as one communications manager noted: ‘We have a Customer Relations Man-
agement (CRM) database which is how we track, monitor and maintain the data that we
have on all the people who have signed up to our work [and] who are interested in us’ (In-
terview 11). More broadly, social media has become an important aspect of connecting to
stakeholders, although not without its detractors. As the interviewee notes:
When social media began to take hold however many years ago…five years ago,
maybe… when I put forward a plan/project for our future communication … Well,
there was feedback which was … negative … ‘You’re not going to waste money on
that’ (Interview 11).
Nevertheless, social media is a challenging environment because of the diverse range of
actors who may potentially be interested in the work of an EU institution, which in turn
can sap vital resources. As one agency communications official noted:
I’ve got a very strict limit to how many resources I would need to put into [social media].
I cannot spare a whole person to do social media. We have in total, perhaps half of
full-time equivalent working on social media (Interview 5).
This evidence suggests ‘connectivity’ has become a key issue for EU agencies and DGs, as
they seek to reach out to stakeholders in response to pressures to apply resources to catch up
with private and voluntary sectors, and relatively new demands to manage a 24-hour news
media cycle. To an extent, this engagement has meant that agencies and DGs have become
more open and connected to their stakeholders. As one interviewee notes:
Have these challenges changed over time? Yes, because 20 years ago they [DGs] were
even more isolated. I will not say ‘arrogant’ but they behaved as a ‘closed shop’. Now
… we are more connected to them (Interview 15).
However, the ways in which this connectivity happens is more about providing informa-
tion than mobilising action. One interviewee expressed dissatisfaction with the superficial
way in which online communication occurs:
I mean, they do open these sort of consultations in terms of the website and things like
that. Often quite technical, you know, ‘Do you think this font is big enough? Do you
think that the navigation menu …’ but it’s not thinking about what kind of content should
be on there [and] how it’s best transmitted to people (Interview 19).
This critical assessment raises an important point – that agencies and DGs are required to
engage their stakeholders online, providing them with information or ‘connecting’ with
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them, but the content of the engagement is often left undefined. Agencies may, for exam-
ple, provide information as a way of evidencing their ‘transparency’, but the information
refers to procedural aspects of what is ‘going on’ within the agency, or opportunities to
submit opinions into a black box process. Such communication is an empty way of pro-
viding technical detail in a more ‘efficient’ or ‘productive’ manner, without offering a
form of political engagement that would enable actors potentially interested in a particular
regulatory area – be it food, pharmaceuticals or environment – to contest or meaningfully
shape a regulatory decision.
Risk Management
The second aspect of Europe’s new technocracy is risk management, namely the process
by which managers in EU institutions engage with stakeholders for the purposes of
reducing potential political fallout or disagreement during regulatory processes. Within
the European Single Market, risk management has become crucial in customs and
international trade, with inter-agency coordination, cooperation with traders and
widespread information sharing viewed as crucial for ensuring safety and security in
the goods being traded and hence a ‘smooth flow of trade’ (European Commission,
2017). At the institutional level, risk management is a consistent driver for agency and
DG staff involved in stakeholder engagement. One interviewee noted, in relation to the
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP):
We do political risk management – the European Commission is a political organization.
If there is a risk stakeholders are excluded then that is a problem. It’s also about learning
and awareness, and flaws in legal construction. You cannot see one without the other.
Outreach is part of the political process. (Interview 3).
This form of risk management involves consultation for the purposes of avoiding damag-
ing politicization in the form of multi-stakeholder disagreement or accusations of ‘bias’ in
processes of scientific assessment and analysis. Engagement is necessary to enable ‘learn-
ing and awareness’ about the issues and displace the potential for contentious issues to be
raised in the media. In the case of the European Medicines Agency, for example, staff en-
gage in risk management by downplaying that there is any risk at all in communications
with stakeholders:
The main focus is not risk but, first of all, every medicine has risks and side effects, so
you always have to look at it in the balance … in the end, we evaluate medicine and rec-
ommend a positive opinion because we think actually that this medicine has a benefit –
that the benefit outweighs the risk (Interview 1).
Other agencies see risk management as a way of displacing the political tensions cre-
ated by bringing private sector stakeholders on board to fill gaps in expertise, recog-
nizing the need for discrete knowledge while maintaining an image of technical
competence:
So we try to really stand firm on the fact that we are a technical body. When we have to
deal with very tricky accounting or risk measures … [where] potentially we are not the
best experts in the market…we are very happy to bring them in, use their expertise to
make a product that is eventually beneficial to everyone. But we do not want to introduce
a political debate in our work (Interview 8).
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Same with colleagues in Stockholm… [their] first task is to monitor outbreaks of dis-
eases… Who see themselves also a bit more as promoters of preparedness, health,
capacity building in general. They’re also organizing conferences, publishing manuals
and brochures that are just on general health policy management or health communica-
tion as well (Interview 17).
Interestingly here, it is the very fact that an agency is engaged with ‘the market’ that it
needs to ‘stand firm’ and maintain its image as a ‘technical body’ concerned with ‘policy
management’.Were the agency disengaged from themarket, its image would not need to be
managed. However, engagement with industry creates the potential for ‘introduc[ing] a po-
litical debate’ –which the agency cannot afford to do. It is therefore invested in achieving ‘a
win-win situation where they are getting more and more interested and they see this as po-
tentially [good] for them’ (Interview 8). Risk management is therefore about maintaining a
balance between ‘evidence-based’ decision making and securing ‘buy in’ from ‘the mar-
ket’. Any imbalance between the two can be seen as an undesirable weakening of agency
competence. Interviewees agreed that there is ‘a big risk… about maintaining reliability
and objectivity in our work while also working closely with external bodies’ (Interview
1), ‘Risk management is a natural thing’ and ‘you should always think about how commu-
nication effects credibility’ (Interview 10) and even that risk is so encompassing that ‘We
are risk managers all the time’ (Interview 2). The emphasis placed on the need to manage
political fallout, or maintain a neutral scientific image differs between agencies and DGs,
but it is clear that risk management is crucial for understanding the roots of EU stakeholder
engagement processes–the perceptions of external actors need to be carefully crafted and
are about active engagement with ‘the market’, consumer representatives and the wider me-
dia to shape their views of the policy process, rather than withdrawal or insulation, as in
Esmark’s ‘old technocracy’.
Performance Management
The final aspect of Europe’s new technocracy is that stakeholder engagement serves as
a primarily functional aspect of the regulatory process – an integral part of how the
Union evaluates its own performance. Despite the potential of stakeholder engagement
to contribute towards normative visions of participatory democracy, normative desir-
ability is only reflected in the ‘mood music’ of stakeholder engagement practices.
Their primary purpose is to link engagement to the functional aims of economic
growth and safety management. The European Food Safety Agency (EFSA), which
operates one of the most extensive stakeholder consultation processes in the Union,
states that:
Engagement is effective only if it takes place at a moment when it maximizes value for
EFSA and stakeholders alike – in other words, when it can help to shape the final
outcome of EFSA’s work. Authentic engagement requires that EFSA identifies clearly
when and how contributions from stakeholders are made, that it remains open to scrutiny
throughout the process, and that it explains when and how stakeholder input is taken into
account (EFSA, 2016, p. 12).
Importantly, and in contrast to traditional notions of technocracy, stakeholder
engagement of this form is not merely ‘for show’ or part of a ‘veneer’ of participative
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engagement. It is deeply functional to the way EFSA works. Its procedures are intended
to include a wide range of stakeholders who are affected by EFSA decisions, including
consumer representatives, farmers, hotels, restaurants and caterers, NGOs and other
diverse organizations. In this sense, it is somewhat reminiscent of deliberative innova-
tions by ambitious academic theorists of EU democracy. However, this inclusive breadth
is justified not in terms of deliberation, but rather as a means to ensure the objectivity of
decision-making. As the agency notes in its engagement strategy, ‘To ensure that the
objectivity of its scientific work is safeguarded, the Agency strives at all times to achieve
a balanced representation of interests and to avoid the possibility that specific commu-
nities exert any undue influence through the various mechanisms it proposes for interac-
tion’ (EFSA, 2016, p. 12, italics added).
In Europe’s new technocracy, engagement through a wide range of mechanisms is
the norm, but is not justified in terms of widening democratic deliberation. Rather, it
is justified as a way of improving regulatory performance. Interviewees from DGs
and agencies stated, for example; ‘You don’t just communicate good news or concen-
trate on the media. You ask the stakeholders as well’ (Interview 2). Similarly,
one agency interviewee noted that ‘as part of our work, we try as much as possible
to work with external stakeholders’ (Interview 8). Stakeholder engagement is seen
as a normalized or functional part of an agency’s technical job, rather than an antith-
esis to it.
In the European Commission, stakeholder engagement is seen as integral to enhancing
the overall performance of the Union and evidence of its value to member states. In one
DG, for example:
Communication with stakeholders is important. Growth and jobs are our main objective
at the Commission, we are here to help Europe grow, we need to work with economic
actors …We have conferences and events to get them to apply to our process. It’s a model
we could use in other areas. We tend to use traditional methods of speaking face to face to
people (Interview 2).
Stakeholder engagement here is integrated within processes of performance monitoring,
integrating workshops and conferences alongside technical assessment. In this sense,
stakeholder engagement bolsters technocratic aims of efficiency and effectiveness, rather
than posing a democratic alternative to them, as has been argued in the debate around EU
democracy. One interviewee from an NGO expressed frustration at this way of engaging
stakeholders throughout EU institutions:
I do not know why…maybe Brussels just attracts people like [the ‘usual suspects’]. I’m
not sure but it’s really that thing if it’s not specifically and expressly written in a directive
or a regulation or in the guidance of how this process works, it does not and cannot and
should not happen (Interview 23).
Less critically, one representative from a consumer organization detailed the close rela-
tionship they have with an EU agency in the field of health:
We are the conduits of information from [agency] employees to the [consumer]
communities because we put their information and their news in our newsletters, member
communications and so on.…We find… sometimes [the agency] need[s] a specific kind of
patient representative so we tap into our members’ network (Interview 22).
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The close relationship between agencies, DGs and consumer/industry organizations
through stakeholder membership on Boards, working groups and other engagement
mechanisms integrates these ‘non-state’ actors within the core institutions of the EU, thus
making them integral to the performance of the Union. Again, it is crucial to stress that
this integration is far more systematic than a traditional ‘technocratic’ perspective would
give credit for. For EU DGs and agencies, engaging stakeholders is central to their per-
ceived capacity to perform adequately. The technical knowledge and professional compe-
tence of participating stakeholders is seen as a key part of the Union’s success, but close
integration of this form does not correspond with traditional views of the EU’s
technocracy.
V. Developing the EU’s New Technocracy
This article has argued that Europe’s ‘New Technocracy’, constructed over the past 20
years, has increasingly engaged with stakeholders in industry and society, but with a
technocratic rationale that puts boundaries on the potential of such engagement to
enhance democracy. The European Commission and decentralized agencies are
commonly engaged with industry, consumer organizations, NGOs and professional
bodies on a regular basis in developing, implementing and evaluating EU regulations.
Specifically, stakeholder involvement is necessary for the purposes of: circulating
information online to inform relevant ‘multipliers’ at national level of regulatory
procedures; crafting an image of technical competence through engagement with
stakeholders, and engaging with stakeholders as a core aspect of monitoring and evalu-
ating regulatory performance.
The interview data and document analysis provides evidence for the three points
above. Taken together, they suggest how ‘responsiveness’ occurs within technocratic
EU bodies at an everyday level. It is precisely through mechanisms of engagement that
EU institutions create and assert their technocratic power. Put simply, the argument of
this article is that such engagement processes are the very means by which (new)
technocratic governance works. Images of technical credibility, information
distribution and performance monitoring are implemented through engagement with a
variety of stakeholder groups, including ‘traditional’ industry and corporate stake-
holders, but also NGOs, consumers and citizens. Engagement is seen by EU
institutional actors as a way of communicating information, managing risk, and
monitoring performance. If such engagement achieves democratic aims, this is a
secondary or tertiary aim, and is not seen as ‘relevant’ where engagement either falls
outside the institution’s functional remit, or does not provide an opportunity for
efficiency in information exchange.
In sum, the data presented in this article suggest that the way EU public managers
justify stakeholder engagement is through technocratic means, but not that they are
opposed to secondary or tertiary democratic benefits that might derive from that
engagement. As such, the key to democratizing EU governance may be less a matter
of creating ’new’ institutional arrangements, than of developing the logic through
which public managers at the EU level can justify and extend stakeholder engagement
practices. This perspective could inform a distinctive approach to recent thinking on
’throughput legitimacy’ in the EU, and the kind of institutional innovations within
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the EU’s governance procedures that might enhance accountability, transparency, inclu-
siveness and openness (Schmidt and Wood, 2019). This approach might suggest
we need fewer ‘new’ structures, and instead, better ways of equipping EU public man-
agers to think innovatively, and act in ’mending’ democratic connections and relation-
ships within their already existing organizational roles and familiar practices (Hendriks
et al., 2020).
One recent example of how this has happened is the European Medicines Agency’s
program of physical public hearings. Standard stakeholder engagement have been
complemented with public hearings where patients themselves can make arguments on
the Agency’s regulatory decisions as they are being made. Unlike many engagement
exercises by EU agencies, there is an explicit aim of ‘engaging the public’ alongside
the ‘information gathering’ exercise (Wood, 2019). Despite the acknowledged restrictions
on deliberation of public hearings, they nevertheless expand the boundaries of
participation and give a democratic rationale to create a hybrid technical/participatory
exercise. Extending this logic further could be an important way of enhancing the
democratic logic of ambitious technocratic organizational reforms.
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Appendix 1: Interviews
1: European Medicines Agency official, author, London, June 2016.
2: DG Sante official, author, telephone, June 2016.
3: DG Trade official, author, telephone, May 2016.
5: OSHA official, author, telephone, August 2016.
8: European Banking Authority official, author, London, June 2016.
10: EIOPA official, author, telephone, July 2016.
11: Eurofound official, author, Dublin, August 2016.
15: Member of European Parliament, author, Brussels, January 2017.
17: European Medicines Agency Official, author, London, January 2017.
19: Non-governmental Organization (Health) official, author, Brussels, January 2017.
22: Consumer rights organization (Health) official, author, Burssels, January 2017.
23: Non-governmental Organization (Environment) official, author, Brussels, January
2017.
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